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9The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment
in a Transboundary Context (Espoo Convention)
 
The 1991 Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a
Transboundary Context (the Espoo Convention)1 was negotiated under
the auspices of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
(ECE) and was signed in Espoo, Finland, in 1991.2 Following six meetings
of the signatories, the Convention entered into force in 1997 and the first
Meeting of the Parties (MoP) took place in Oslo in 1998. The Strategic
Environmental Assessment (SEA) Protocol to the Convention was adopted
in 2003, and has been signed by thirty-six States as well as by the EC.3
The institutional development within the Espoo regime has progressed
over time. The Meeting of the Parties, representing the voice of States parties,
has taken place three times, and has adopted many important decisions per-
taining to the institutional structure of the Espoo Convention. The Bureau
of the Convention was established as an organ to co-ordinate the work per-
taining to the development of the system of the Convention between the
Meetings of the Parties. Secretariat tasks are handled by the ECE. The MoP is
now assisted by the Working Group on Environmental Impact Assessment
(EIA) and the Implementation Committee. The Working Group on EIA
assists the MoP in the implementation of the Convention and the manage-
ment of the work-plan, and the Implementation Committee has the dual

11 The Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Espoo,
Finland, 25 February 1991, in force 10 September 1997, Doc. E.ECE.1250. The Convention
text can be accessed via the website of the Convention at www.unece.org/env/eia/documents/
conventiontextenglish.pdf.
12 For an overview of the negotiations, see R. Connelly, ‘The UN Convention on EIA in a
Transboundary Context: A Historical Perspective’ (1999) 19 Environmental Impact Assessment
Review 37–46.
13 Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment to the Convention on Environmental
Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context, Kiev, 21 May 2003, Doc. ECE/MP.EIA/
2003/2. The Protocol can be accessed via the website of the Convention at www.unece.org/ env/
eia/documents/protocolenglish.pdf.
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task of developing the reporting system and considering individual cases of
non-compliance.
Before taking up the main focus of this chapter – namely, the dispute res-
olution, compliance control and enforcement procedures of the Espoo
regime – it will be useful to examine the substantive rules of the Espoo
Convention. The Convention regulates situations where a proposed activ-
ity in one contracting State (the origin State) is likely to cause a significant
adverse transboundary impact on another State’s environment. The
Convention tries to manage these situations by requiring the parties to co-
operate with each other before the activity is undertaken. In order for this
procedure to function effectively, the Convention requires the States parties
to establish national EIA procedures as well as licensing procedures, with
foreign impacts and foreign actors integrated into both.4
The origin State is first required to notify the potentially affected State of
the likely significant adverse transboundary impact and to provide basic
information regarding the proposed activity. The affected State must next
confirm that it wants to participate in the procedure.5 The origin State is
then obligated to study the transboundary impacts together with the
affected State and allow the public of that State to participate in the process
on the same terms as its own public would be entitled to.6 After the impact
assessment, the affected State has an opportunity to comment on the pro-
posed activity and its likely impacts, through consultations with the origin
State. The public of the affected State is entitled to provide its comments on
the proposed activity on the same terms as apply to the public of the origin
State.7 The final decision taken on the proposed activity in the origin State
must take due account of the comments from the potentially affected State
and its public, and must be delivered to the affected State.8 The States
parties are not required to determine whether the impacts studied ulti-
mately materialize, as post-project analysis is optional.9
The SEA Protocol requires the contracting States to establish a national
SEA procedure – a procedure by which the likely environmental effects of a
plan, programme or policy are examined with the help of all relevant
parties – rather than on establishing a transboundary procedure between
States; only one provision in the Protocol, article 10, addresses the latter
procedure. The Protocol requires the contracting States to create an SEA
     
4 Art. 2(2), (3) and (7) of the Espoo Convention. 5 Ibid., art. 3(1), (2) and (3).
6 Ibid.; see art. 3(4)–(8) and art. 2(6) on non-discrimination. 7 Ibid., arts. 4 and 5.
8 Ibid., art. 6. 9 Ibid., art. 7 and Appendix V.
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procedure that evaluates, with the involvement of the environmental and
health authorities and the general public, the likely environmental and
health impacts of plans and programmes.10 Evaluation of the environmen-
tal and health impacts of policies and legislation is optional for the
parties.11 In the case of likely significant transboundary environmental
and/or health impacts, the origin State must notify the potentially affected
State, after which consultations may take place.12
The substantive rules of the Espoo Convention and the SEA Protocol set
out clear obligations and rights for the States parties. This approach stands
in direct contrast to that found in many other international environmental
treaties, for example the Convention on Biological Diversity, whose
primary rules are so loose and open-ended that their legal status can be
questioned.13 The nature of a treaty’s substantive rules has an impact on
how the compliance control and enforcement systems are organized in the
treaty regime. If the parties and the treaty bodies fail to agree on what is
required in a treaty, and perhaps even disagree over whether some of the
rules in the convention are binding or not (or are soft rules), it becomes
much more difficult to establish a compliance control system, as the object
of what is controlled and reviewed is uncertain. In the case of the Espoo
Convention, substantial consensus exists on the content and scope of the
primary rules, which greatly facilitates the creation of a compliance control
system.
9.1 Dispute resolution
9.1.1 The basic dispute resolution mechanism under the Convention
The need to have a separate provision for dispute resolution arose in the
first (of six) meetings of the ad hoc Working Group that was entrusted by
the Senior Advisers of the ECE14 to draw up an international agreement on
the matter.15 The Espoo Convention thus came to include a provision on
   
10 Arts. 5–9 of the SEA Protocol. 11 Ibid., art. 13. 12 Ibid., art. 10.
13 The Convention on Biological Diversity, Rio de Janeiro, 5 June 1992, 31 ILM 818 (1992).
The Convention can be accessed via the Convention’s website at www.biodiv.org/convention/
articles.asp.
14 The body known as the Senior Advisers to the ECE governments was transformed in 1994 to
become the Committee on Environmental Protection. For the terms of reference of both bodies,
see the ECE website at www.unece.org/env/cep/tor.htm.
15 Connelly, EIA in a transboundary perspective, 1999, p. 40.
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dispute settlement which also applies to the SEA Protocol.16 The provision
is set out in article 15:
1. If a dispute arises between two or more Parties about the interpreta-
tion or application of this Convention, they shall seek a solution by
negotiation or by any other method of dispute settlement acceptable to
the parties to the dispute.
2. When signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or acceding to this
Convention, or at any time thereafter, a Party may declare in writing to
the Depositary that for a dispute not resolved in accordance with para-
graph 1 of this Article, it accepts one or both of the following means of
dispute settlement as compulsory in relation to any Party accepting the
same obligation:
(a) Submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice;
(b) Arbitration in accordance with the procedure set out in
Appendix VII.
3. If the parties to the dispute have accepted both means of dispute set-
tlement referred to in paragraph 2 of this Article, the dispute may be
submitted only to the International Court of Justice, unless the parties
agree otherwise.
This article is very much in line with the basic premise of dispute settle-
ment provisions in international environmental treaties: the parties remain
fully free to resolve their dispute by any means they deem appropriate,
although the article does give them the option of making declarations
accepting compulsory third-party settlement.
Article 15 sets out two main channels for resolving disputes between con-
tracting States about the interpretation or application of the Convention.
First, if a party has declared in writing to the Depositary that it accepts a
compulsory dispute settlement – either the procedure in the International
Court of Justice (ICJ) or arbitration as set out in Appendix VII, or both – the
disputes it has with other contracting States may be decided by compulsory
dispute settlement. However, even when both disputants have made such a
declaration, they always have the possibility – if they so agree – to have the
dispute decided using political dispute settlement methods (‘for a dispute
not resolved in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article …’17). The dec-
larations become important in cases where no political solution can be
     
16 Art. 20 of the SEA Protocol.
17 Art. 15(2) of the Espoo Convention. In other words, the declarations give the parties the option
of submitting the dispute to compulsory dispute settlement; the provision does not force them
to do so.
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found since, depending on the content of the declarations the parties have
given, the potentially affected State may take the origin State to the ICJ or
initiate arbitration.18 To date, Austria, Bulgaria, Liechtenstein and the
Netherlands have declared that they accept both means of compulsory
dispute settlement identified in article 15(2) of the Convention, meaning
that, if a dispute between the parties cannot be handled through the politi-
cal mechanism, the ICJ will have jurisdiction over it.19
There is one pending dispute between the parties to the Espoo
Convention. The Polish Minister of the Environment has sent a letter to the
German Federal Minister of Environment, Nature Conservation and
Nuclear Safety with a request to start negotiations. The dispute relates to
the management of the River Oder, and focuses on whether Germany has
adequately taken into account the comments from the public and the
outcome of the consultation in its final decision, as required by article 6(1)
of the Convention. The first meeting between the parties took place in
Wroclaw on 12 February 2003.20
9.1.2 Special dispute resolution: the inquiry commission procedure
If a dispute centres on whether the origin State is required to initiate a
transboundary EIA procedure of the Espoo Convention, then the
   
18 If both have accepted only arbitration, then it is arbitration according to Appendix VII (simi-
larly, if both have accepted only the ICJ, then the ICJ will be the forum used). If both parties have
accepted both means of dispute settlement, then the ICJ will be used provided that the parties do
not agree otherwise, in which case Appendix VII arbitration will be applied. However, if one
party has accepted only arbitration and the other only the ICJ, the provision leaves open the
question whether both parties are bound to have the dispute resolved by compulsory dispute
settlement since the provision speaks of the ‘same obligation’, which can interpreted as referring
to the compulsory dispute settlement in general or a means of compulsory dispute settlement.
19 For the declarations, see the Espoo Convention website at www.unece.org/env/eia/ convratif.html.
If the parties, or one of the parties, have not given such a declaration to the Depositary, then para.
1 applies and the parties are free to resolve their dispute via any method of political dispute settle-
ment they deem necessary. If the dispute cannot be resolved by these mechanisms, art. 15 cannot
be resorted to, because the compulsory dispute settlement becomes possible only through the dec-
larations. Where these declarations have not been made, the parties may seek remedies under the
regime of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and/or general international law.
20 See the Review of Implementation, p. 198, which is available from the Implementation
Committee website at www.unece.org/env/eia/implementation.htm. According to the German
official in charge, Germany commenced this procedure even before the Convention became
binding on it; it thus does not regard the procedure in which the Polish state and its nationals
were parties as a regular transboundary EIA procedure or consider art. 15 to be applicable.
There is currently a bilateral working group studying the issue (e-mail communication on 28
January 2005).
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Convention provides a special dispute settlement mechanism known as
the inquiry commission procedure.21 This concept came in quite late in
the negotiations leading up to the adoption of the Convention, in the
fourth meeting of the ad hoc Working Group.22 The particulars of the
inquiry commission procedure were then negotiated in the Working
Group’s fifth and, especially, sixth and final meeting.23 This particular
method of resolving disputes is actually quite rare in international envi-
ronmental treaties. The only treaty before the Espoo Convention to have
had such a procedure is the 1974 Nordic Environment Protection
Convention, but this procedure has never, to the author’s knowledge,
been invoked.24
The basic provision establishing an obligation on the part of the origin
State to commence a transboundary EIA procedure is article 3(1), which
reads:
For a proposed activity listed in Appendix I that is likely to cause a sig-
nificant adverse transboundary impact, the Party of origin shall, for
the purposes of ensuring adequate and effective consultations under
Article 5, notify any Party which it considers may be an affected Party as
early as possible and no later than when informing its own public
about that proposed activity.
If the origin State does not notify the potentially affected State concerning
a proposed activity listed in Appendix I (list of activities known to be envi-
ronmentally harmful), and the affected State is of the opinion that the
activity is likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary impact, the
affected State has a right to request information from the origin State for
‘the purposes of holding discussions on whether there is likely to be a sig-
nificant adverse transboundary impact’.25 If the concerned States cannot
agree in their discussions on whether there is likely to be a significant
adverse transboundary impact, or if the origin State refuses to discuss the
issue, the affected State ‘may submit that question to an inquiry commis-
sion in accordance with the provisions of Appendix IV to advise on the
likelihood of significant adverse transboundary impact, unless they agree
     
21 The SEA Protocol does not contain an inquiry commission procedure, even though it does have
a provision on a transboundary procedure. See art. 10 of the Protocol.
22 Connelly, ‘The UN Convention on EIA in a Transboundary Context’, p. 42.
23 Ibid., pp. 43–4.
24 Art. 12 of the Nordic Environment Protection Convention, Stockholm, 19 February 1974, in
force 5 October 1976, 13 ILM 352 (1974). 25 Art. 3(7) of the Espoo Convention.
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on another method of settling this question’.26 The affected State can
thus initiate an inquiry commission procedure even against the origin
State’s will.
Although many of the relevant terms are defined in the Convention,27
determining whether a significant adverse transboundary impact is likely
to result from a proposed activity listed in Appendix I is bound to be a
difficult and relative task, and for this reason both States may opt to seek
advice through an inquiry commission procedure. Then again, if the origin
State has persistently rejected any discussion of the applicability of the
Espoo Convention to the case, it is unlikely to take part in the inquiry com-
mission procedure either. The Convention contains rules for both situa-
tions, i.e. when both States initiate an inquiry commission procedure and
when only the affected State does so. In both instances, the procedure starts
by the parties (or party) notifying the Secretariat of the Convention of their
(its) intention to commence it. This notification must also state the
subject-matter of the inquiry. The Secretariat then notifies all parties to the
Convention of this submission, a measure which broadens the awareness of
the dispute to the whole treaty community.
If both parties seek advice through an inquiry commission procedure,
each proceeds, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Appendix IV, to appoint
a scientific or technical expert as its representative to the commission. The
two experts then appoint by common agreement a third expert, who serves
as president of the commission and whose impartiality must be ensured.28
After adopting its own rules of procedure, the inquiry commission may
take all appropriate measures to carry out its functions, a task in which it
clearly needs assistance from the concerned States.29 Paragraph 7 of
Appendix IV requires the parties to an inquiry commission procedure to
facilitate the work of the commission using all means at their disposal.30
The decision by the inquiry commission as to whether the proposed activ-
ity listed in Appendix I is likely to cause a significant adverse transboundary
impact is only advisory in nature but, where negative for the origin State,
   
26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., art. 1.
28 Ibid., Appendix IV, para. 2, which states that he or she ‘shall not be a national of one of the Parties
nor have his or her usual place of residence in the territory of one of these parties, nor be employed
by any of them, nor have dealt with the matter in any other capacity’. Para. 3 then provides: ‘If the
president of the inquiry commission has not been designated within two months of the appoint-
ment of the second expert, the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Europe shall,
at the request of either party, designate the president within a further two-month period.’
29 Ibid., Appendix IV, para. 6. 30 Ibid., Appendix IV, para. 7.
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certainly puts pressure on that State to initiate the transboundary EIA
procedure.31
There are special rules for cases where the affected State invokes the
inquiry commission procedure against the origin State without the partici-
pation of the latter. The procedure commences as described above, with the
affected State making a submission to the Secretariat, which then informs
the other parties to the Convention. After the affected State has appointed
its expert to the commission, if the origin State does not appoint its expert
within one month of its being notified by the Secretariat, the affected
State may inform the Executive Secretary of the ECE accordingly.32 The
Executive Secretary is empowered by paragraph 4 of Appendix IV to desig-
nate the president of the inquiry commission, who will then require the
origin State to appoint its expert. If the origin State remains passive and
fails to appoint its expert within one month of the president’s request, the
president must inform the Executive Secretary of the ECE, who then has to
make the appointment within the next two months. The affected State can
thus invoke the inquiry commission procedure even without any participa-
tion by the origin State. According to paragraph 9 of Appendix IV, if the
origin State does not appear before the commission or fails to present its
case, the affected State may request that the commission continue the pro-
ceedings and complete its work, which it must do since ‘absence of a party
or failure of a party to present its case shall not constitute a bar to the con-
tinuation and completion of the work of the inquiry commission’.33 It
should be borne in mind that, if the origin State does not participate at all
in the inquiry commission procedure, it becomes very hard for the com-
mission to do its work, given that the origin State has most of the relevant
information about the proposed activity.
The inquiry commission procedure has been invoked in one recent case.
On 19 August 2004, the Secretariat of the Espoo Convention notified all the
parties to the Convention, as required by paragraph 1 of Appendix IV, that
Romania had made a submission requesting the establishment of an
inquiry commission to advise on the likelihood of a significant adverse
transboundary impact arising from the Ukrainian project ‘Danube–Black
Sea Deep Water Navigation Canal in the Ukrainian Sector of the Danubian
Delta’. The concerned States, Romania and Ukraine, were not able to agree
     
31 Ibid., Appendix IV, paras. 12–14. 32 Ibid., Appendix IV, para. 3.
33 Ibid., Appendix IV, para. 9.
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whether a significant adverse transboundary impact from the project
would be likely, and both nominated their experts to the commission.
However, the two experts were not able to agree on a third expert – the pres-
ident of the commission – within two months of the appointment of the
second expert, whereupon, on 17 December 2004, Romania asked the
Executive Secretary of the ECE to make the appointment of the president
pursuant to paragraph 3 of Appendix IV. The Executive Secretary did so,
and the first meeting of the inquiry commission was held on 26 January
2005 in Geneva. Further meetings are scheduled for 24 February and 13
May, with site visits from 10 to 16 April 2005.34 In principle, according to
paragraph 13 of Appendix IV, the inquiry commission is to present its final
opinion within two months of the date on which it was established, which
did not take place in this case. However, paragraph 13 also provides that the
inquiry commission can extend the time limit for an additional two
months, a timeframe that may prove to be challenging in this case, given
that parties have already scheduled a meeting for 13 May 2005.
The Espoo Convention provides three mechanisms by which parties can
resolve their disputes: the Implementation Committee, to be discussed
below, the inquiry commission procedure, and the general dispute settle-
ment procedures. This range of alternatives seems like a sound approach in
principle, since it enables parties to avoid resorting to third-party dispute
settlement, which is a measure to be used only when all others have been
exhausted. Thus far, four parties have filed a declaration to have their dis-
putes with other parties decided through compulsory third-party dispute
settlement. With the Convention having been in force for seven years, there
are two disputes pending between States parties: one is being dealt with in
an inquiry commission procedure, the other through general dispute set-
tlement, as discussed above.
9.2 Compliance control
Compliance control is the mechanism whereby the treaty community
monitors and reviews whether the States parties have observed their
   
34 The information about inquiry procedures can be accessed through the Espoo Convention
website at www.unece.org/env/eia/inquiry.htm. See also the responses by States parties as to
whether they have made use of the inquiry procedure, presented in the full Review of
Implementation (Advance Copy, 30 August 2004), p. 197, which can also be accessed through
the Espoo Convention’s website at www.unece.org/env/eia/implementation.htm.
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obligations as set out in the Convention. The principal need here is for an
institutional structure by which such compliance can be monitored in
general. There is also a need to establish basic rules and procedures by
which compliance information flows to the treaty bodies from the States
parties, procedures as to how the treaty bodies may ensure that this subjec-
tive information corresponds to the reality (the reporting procedure) and
procedures by which potential cases of non-compliance are examined by
the treaty bodies (the non-compliance procedure).
The Espoo Convention did not originally provide much in the area of
compliance control. It did establish the basis for institutional development
in article 11 by creating the Meeting of the Parties and defining its terms of
reference; otherwise, all legal changes to the Convention are to be made
through formal amendments, as set out in article 14. Curiously, article 11
does not explicitly mandate that the MoP create any sub-organs, frequently
so relevant in the management of international environmental treaties.35
9.2.1 The system for reviewing treaty compliance
In contrast to its SEA Protocol,36 the Espoo Convention does not impose
any reporting obligation on the parties. Unlike some international envi-
ronmental treaties, the Convention did not require the parties to provide
an initial submission of information, nor does it require them to submit
regular reports. The farthest the Convention has gone in this respect is
article 11(2) setting out the terms of reference of the MoP, essentially
requiring the parties to continuously review implementation of the
Convention in numerous ways.
The second MoP, held in Sofia in 2001, decided to develop a reporting
system ‘on how the obligations of the Convention have been complied
with, both at the general level and by particular Parties’.37 A task force38 was
established at the Sofia meeting to handle the review procedure until the
system proper under the Implementation Committee became operational.
The ensuing review was published at the third MoP, in Croatia in 2004, and
     
35 Art. 11(2) of the Espoo Convention.
36 Art. 14(7) of the Protocol stipulates as follows: ‘Each Party shall, at intervals to be determined by
the Meeting of the Parties to the Convention serving as the Meeting of the Parties to this
Protocol, report to the Meeting of the Parties to the Convention serving as the Meeting of the
Parties to the Protocol on measures that it has taken to implement the Protocol.’
37 Decision II/11, Adoption of the Work-plan (ECE/MP.EIA/4, 7 August 2001).
38 The delegation of the United Kingdom led the task force, assisted by the Secretariat.
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it focused on how the parties had applied the obligations of the Convention
with regard to the transboundary EIA procedure.39 In keeping with the
mandate of the task force, the review did not analyze whether the parties
had complied with their obligations; it only examined the experiences of
the parties with a view to improving the regime, basically summarizing
what the parties had experienced in implementing and applying the
Convention. This task clearly differed from the regular analysis of State
reports with a view to detecting non-compliance.
The first review of implementation was carried out by the task force,
not the Implementation Committee. The decision establishing the
Implementation Committee in the 2001 Sofia MoP gave the Committee the
responsibility of developing a reporting procedure, and it is expected to
prepare a revised and simplified questionnaire and draft a review of imple-
mentation for the fourth MoP.40 The third MoP adopted an amendment
formalizing the regular reporting requirement for the parties, which when
it enters into force will provide a formal basis for the reporting of compli-
ance information to the Implementation Committee and the MoP. The
amendment inserted a new article, article 14bis, into the Convention.
Article 14bis provides as follows:
1. The Parties shall review compliance with the provisions of this
Convention on the basis of the compliance procedure, as a non-
adversarial and assistance-oriented procedure adopted by the
Meeting of the Parties. The review shall be based on, but not limited
to, regular reporting by the Parties. The Meeting of Parties shall
decide on the frequency of regular reporting required by the Parties
and the information to be included in those regular reports.
2. The compliance procedure shall be available for application to any
protocol adopted under this Convention.41
The role of the Implementation Committee in examining State reports is
still taking shape and it seems that its role in the near future will be largely to
do what the task force did, namely, to conduct an evaluation of State behav-
iour in terms of the future development of the regime rather than to carry
out a review focused on detecting non-compliance. The reason for this is
that there will be no legal obligation to report until the second amendment
   
39 Full Review of Implementation (Advance Copy, 30 August 2004).
40 Decision III/9 of the third MoP (ECE/MP.EIA/6, 13 September 2004).
41 Ibid., Decision III/7, Second Amendment to the Espoo Convention, para. f.
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to the Convention enters into force. Yet, if and when the formal amendment
quoted above enters into force, the Implementation Committee will be
empowered to develop a regular system of State reporting.
9.2.2 The non-compliance mechanism: the Implementation Committee
The Espoo Convention has no provisions on non-compliance, but the
work-plan for the years 1998 to 2000, formulated in 1998 at the first MoP in
Oslo, included work on non-compliance guidelines.42 The delegation of the
United Kingdom, which was assigned to lead a task force in this area,
produced a background paper entitled ‘Compliance with Multilateral
Environmental Agreements’, in which it outlined the existing non-
compliance mechanisms and identified certain trends in these mechanisms
for the Working Group on EIA to consider.43 Decision II/4 by the MoP –
setting out the structure and functions of the Implementation Committee
– drew heavily from the Implementation Committee which supervised the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and its proto-
cols, which had been established by that Convention’s Executive Body in its
Decision 1997/2.44
The third MoP, held in Croatia in 2004, changed the structure and
functions of the Implementation Committee, but only very slightly. The
principal change, seen throughout Decision III/2, is its emphasis on open-
ness and transparency, a development much influenced by the other ECE
convention, the Aarhus Convention. The third MoP introduced another
change, prompted by the adoption of the SEA Protocol in May 2003 and the
concomitant need to determine whether the Implementation Committee is
empowered to supervise observance of the Protocol. In its Decision III/2,
the MoP ‘encourag[ed] the application of the procedure for the review of
compliance to the Protocol on Strategic Environmental Assessment and to
any future protocols to the Convention, in accordance with their rele-
vant provisions’.45 Furthermore, as noted above, the MoP adopted an
amendment which, when it enters into force, will make it clear that the
Implementation Committee procedure also applies to supervision of the
     
42 Decision I/6, chapter 5 (ECE/MP.EIA/2, 10 November 1998).
43 MP.EIA/WG.1/1999/7, 28 July 1999.
44 The first draft, MP.EIA/WG.1/2000/9, 27 March 2000. The Executive Body Decision 1997/2,
ECE/EB.AIR/53.
45 Decision III/2, Review of Compliance, para. 4, ECE/MP.EIA/6, 13 September 2004.
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SEA Protocol. What is more, the SEA Protocol itself contains an explicit
provision on the applicability of the Implementation Committee proce-
dure to the Protocol.46 A possible challenge for the Implementation
Committee in this respect is how it can adjust its work to include not only
inter-State situations and disputes, as set out in the Espoo Convention, but
also situations regulated by the SEA Protocol, which focuses primarily on
requiring the contracting States to create and implement national SEA
procedures.
Where non-compliance is suspected, the contracting States may notify
the Secretariat of the Convention with corroborating information.47 The
Secretariat will then inform the State alleged to be in non-compliance and
allow it to supply information of its own. Thereafter, the Secretariat will
transmit these bodies of information to the Implementation Committee.48
It is also possible that the origin State will notify the Secretariat that it is
unable to comply with the obligations of the Convention, either after the
notification by the affected State or on its own initiative. In such cases,
the State is obligated to inform the Secretariat of its reasons for non-
compliance, and this information is delivered to the Implementation
Committee.49 The Committee may also commence the procedure on its
own initiative with the party that has failed to comply with its obligations.50
The Implementation Committee has two options in proceeding with a
case of suspected non-compliance: it may request further information
on the case through the Secretariat or it may even gather information in
the territory of the concerned States, but only at its invitation.51 The
Committee must ensure the confidentiality of the information delivered to
it.52 The concerned States and the public are entitled to participate in
the proceedings if the Committee does not decide otherwise, but not in the
preparation and adoption of any report or recommendations of the
Committee.53 The Implementation Committee Procedure is without prej-
udice to the general dispute settlement clause, meaning that, even when a
procedure is pending, the parties can try to resolve the dispute on their
own.54 When a matter is being considered under the inquiry commission
procedure, however, it may not be submitted to any other dispute settle-
ment mechanism under the Convention.55
   
46 Art. 14(6) of the SEA Protocol.
47 Decision III/2, Annex II, Review of Compliance, Appendix, para. 5(a), ECE/MP.EIA/6, 13
September 2004. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid., para. 5(b). 50 Ibid., para. 6. 51 Ibid., para. 7.
52 Ibid., para. 8. 53 Ibid., paras. 9 and 10. 54 Ibid., para. 14. 55 Ibid., para. 15.
M616 ULFSTEIN TEXT M/UP.qxd  15/9/06  3:04 PM  Page 230 Gary Gary's G4:Users:Gary:Public:Gar
As noted above, the Convention did not originally contain any provi-
sions on non-compliance. In the third MoP, in Croatia in 2004, the parties
adopted the above-quoted second amendment to the Convention, which,
if and when it enters into force, will formalize the status of the
Implementation Committee.
To date, while the Implementation Committee has not been called upon
to resolve any disputes, it has received a communication from an NGO.
This presented a difficult problem for the Committee since, in contrast to
the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention, it may not receive
direct submissions from other than States parties. The Committee dis-
cussed this challenge extensively in its third meeting, outlining various
alternatives for the role of the public.56 In the fourth meeting, the President
of the Committee drew the Committee’s attention to a letter from an NGO
addressed both to the Committee and to the Secretariat; the Secretariat had
forwarded the letter to the Committee on 26 August 2003. The Committee
did not address the fundamental question of how to deal with such com-
munications but only agreed that the information that had been provided
thus far was insufficient for the case to be considered.57
However, in the fifth meeting of the Committee, the case came back to
the Committee. The Secretariat had received a copy of a letter sent by the
same NGO to a party regarding a potential non-compliance issue and then
made this letter available to the Committee.58 It is worth noting here that
the rules of the Committee permit it to initiate the procedure when it
becomes aware of possible non-compliance. The Committee’s conclusion
in this respect is worth quoting:
The Committee agreed that it should acknowledge the latest commu-
nication and that its response should reflect the views of all its
members. The majority agreed not to consider the information,
because considering unsolicited information from NGOs and the
public relating to specific cases of non-compliance was not within
the Committee’s existing mandate. A minority disagreed, interpreting
the present mandate (decision II/4, app., para. 5) to mean that there
     
56 Paras. 5–15 of the minutes of the third meeting of the Implementation Committee,
MP.EIA/WG.1/2003/8, 10 July 2003.
57 Para. 10 of the minutes of the fourth meeting of the Implementation Committee, MP.EIA/
WG.1/2004/3, 17 December 2003.
58 Para. 5 of the minutes of the fifth meeting of the Implementation Committee, MP.EIA/
WG.1/2004/4, 8 April 2004.
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were no restrictions on how the Committee became aware of a case of
possible non-compliance, preferring to examine the information
further.59
In the present author’s view, it seems hard to defend the position of the
majority except in terms of political realism. The Committee certainly
had become aware of a case of possible non-compliance that was not a
direct submission from an NGO but a copy of a letter by an NGO that a
State party had sent to the Secretariat, which it had then forwarded to the
Committee. If the case had been a direct submission from an NGO,
there would have been better grounds for refusing to examine it. This
decision by the Implementation Committee will most likely serve as a
precedent: it is hard to see how after this decision the non-compliance
mechanism could be triggered by parties other than the States parties.
The Espoo Convention’s non-compliance review cannot be started
even by the Secretariat, as it is only the Committee that can ‘open’ a case
and contact the State party alleged to be in non-compliance. In the
case of, for example, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary
Air Pollution non-compliance mechanism, the Secretariat of that
Convention can initiate a procedure with the State alleged to be in non-
compliance on the basis of information provided by, for instance, an
environmental NGO.60
As noted above, the Implementation Committee has neither
received any submissions from States parties nor ‘become aware’ of any
non-compliance by a party. With no formal submission from the States
parties, a case has to be opened by the Implementation Committee itself,
a course of action it has been reluctant to take. The Committee’s conclu-
sions quoted above clearly indicate that it will not easily start the
non-compliance procedure without formal submissions from States
parties, a policy also seen in the MoP’s increased emphasis on requiring
parties to make self-submissions.61 When the reporting system becomes
obligatory, the Committee will have a good basis for starting a non-
compliance procedure on the basis of the information obtained from the
State reports.
   
59 Ibid., para. 7.
60 Statement of the secretary to the Executive Body of the LRTAP Convention in the third meeting
of the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus Convention, para. 7 of the minutes of the third
meeting (MP.PP/C.1/2004/2, 2 March 2004).
61 See para. 1 of Decision III/2, ECE/MP.EIA/6, 13 September 2004.
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9.2.3 Enforcement
According to the rules that govern the work of the Implementation
Committee, the Committee cannot take decisions of its own, a mandate
differing, for example, from that of the Compliance Committee of the
Aarhus Convention.62 The Implementation Committee can only draft a rec-
ommendation on a compliance case to the MoP, which makes the final deci-
sion.63 If consensus cannot be reached in the MoP, the recommendation by
the Implementation Committee will be accepted if a three-quarters major-
ity of the parties present and voting favours it.64 The party suspected of non-
compliance cannot block the decision, since consensus is not required. Yet,
not even such a decision is binding on the non-compliant State, since it is a
decision of the MoP, which, arguably, is non-binding, although arguments
to the contrary have been put forth in the legal literature.65
Decision III/2, Review of Compliance, of the MoP does not specify the
measures that can be taken in the case of non-compliance. It is only stipu-
lated that the MoP may decide ‘upon appropriate general measures to bring
about compliance with the Convention and measures to assist an individ-
ual party’s compliance’.66 This would seem to refer to two basic approaches,
enforcement and management. The former entails implementation of neg-
ative measures against the party in non-compliance and the latter assis-
tance for parties in complying with the obligations of the Convention.
However, it is still very unclear what form these measures might take, as the
     
62 Para. XI of the Annex to Decision I/7 of the first MoP, ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8. The Compliance
Committee is empowered by its founding document to provide advice and facilitate assistance
to individual parties concerning their implementation situation pending consideration by the
meeting of the parties. The Committee may also make recommendations and request an imple-
mentation strategy pending the decision by the meeting of the parties but only when an agree-
ment has been reached with the non-compliant state.
63 Para. 13 of the Appendix to Decision III/2 of the MoP, ECE/MP.EIA/6, 13 September 2004.
64 Ibid.
65 It is of course possible that decisions by the MoP can be seen as ‘any subsequent agreement
between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provi-
sions’, as stated in Art. 31(3)(a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Or, as has been
suggested by Churchill and Ulfstein, the regime of the Espoo Convention may qualify as an
Autonomous Institutional Arrangement (AIA), an entity comparable to an intergovernmental
organization, with the concomitant possibility that the decisions of its plenary organ are
binding on the States parties. See Robin R. Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous
Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed
Phenomenon in International Law’ (2000) 94 American Journal of International Law 623–59.
66 Para. 13 of the Appendix to the Decision III/2 of the MoP, ECE/MP.EIA/6, 13 September 2004.
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Implementation Committee has not had to decide any actual cases of non-
compliance nor has it addressed the issue in its meetings. Given the recent
amendment to the Convention providing that the ‘Parties shall review
compliance with the provisions of this Convention on the basis of the
compliance procedure, as a non-adversarial and assistance-oriented proce-
dure’,67 it seems likely that the procedure is very much tilted towards using
a managerial rather than an enforcement approach.
One problem that the Implementation Committee has been well aware
of since its third meeting is that, with MoPs taking place only every three
years, a considerable amount of time may elapse before the MoP can take
a decision on an issue decided by the Committee and a response to non-
compliance made.68 The trend in this issue might very well be that the
Implementation Committee will follow the lead of the Aarhus Compliance
Committee and become empowered to take certain decisions by itself, with
more severe consequences for the parties being decided by the MoP.69
It is hard to evaluate the direction which the collective decisions to
counter non-compliance might take, as no case has proceeded that far. To
date, the Implementation Committee, which must draw up the particulars
of reactions to non-compliance since it recommends them to the MoP, has
not started elaborating guidelines as to the kinds of measures the MoP
could take if the Committee should discover a case of non-compliance.
While this is no doubt due in part to the fact that the Committee has not
dealt with any cases, such guidelines are precisely the kinds of measures
that should be elaborated before any case even comes before the
Implementation Committee and the MoP.
9.2.4 Evaluation
A number of general trends can be identified with respect to reporting,
non-compliance mechanisms and enforcement rules and procedures in the
   
67 Decision III/7, Second Amendment to the Espoo Convention in the third MoP, para. f,
ECE/MP.EIA/6, 13 September 2004.
68 Para. 21 of the minutes of the third meeting of the Implementation Committee, MP.EIA/
WG.1/2003/8, 10 July 2003. The same issue was taken up in the fourth (para. 13 of the minutes
of the fourth meeting of the Implementation Committee, MP.EIA/WG.1/2004/3, 17 December
2003) and fifth meetings of the Implementation Committee (para. 15 of the minutes of the fifth
meeting of the Implementation Committee, MP.EIA/WG.1/2004/4, 8 April 2004).
69 See Parts XI and XII of the founding document of the Compliance Committee of the Aarhus
Convention, Annex, ‘Structure and Functions of the Compliance Committee and Procedures
for the Review of Compliance’, Decision I/7, Review of Compliance, ECE/MP.PP/2/Add.8.
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Espoo regime. First, the Convention itself provides no guidance in these
matters; the MoPs have developed the compliance system as it presently
stands. Secondly, in the third MoP, the second amendment to the
Convention was adopted which, if and when it enters into force, will
provide a formal basis for a compliance system. Finally, the SEA Protocol
has seemingly learned the lesson lost on its parent Convention and pro-
vided for a compliance system in its article 14.
Yet, there will be many questions to be answered in the near future where
development of a compliance system is concerned. The second amendment
to the Espoo Convention, which formalizes the compliance system, was
adopted on 4 June 2004 and has not yet70 been ratified by any State. Even
when the amendment enters into force someday – as will happen in all like-
lihood – it will probably apply to only some parties, making it hard to
operate a collective compliance system on an equal basis. Another interest-
ing question is whether the SEA Protocol will formalize the status of the
Implementation Committee, for it contains an explicit provision to this
effect; then again, the Protocol has yet to be ratified by States. Many ques-
tions thus remain to be resolved by not only the entry into force of the rele-
vant instruments but also the number of States that ultimately ratify those
instruments.
9.3 Overall evaluation
International environmental treaties – the Espoo Convention among
these – exhibit a clear trend towards having similar provisions for dispute
resolution: they keep dispute settlement in the hands of the States
parties but provide the parties with the possibility of making a declara-
tion that they will have their disputes resolved by a third-party proce-
dure.71 Significantly, the general dispute settlement clause of the Espoo
Convention seems to have established a ‘precedent’ for other ECE environ-
mental protection conventions. In contrast to the first environmental
protection convention of the ECE, the 1979 Convention on Long-Range
     
70 November 2005.
71 See, for instance, the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Vienna, 22
March 1985, in force 22 September 1988, UNEP Doc. IG.53/5 (art. 11), the 1992 Convention on
Biological Diversity (art. 27), the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, New York, 9 May 1992, in force 21 March 1994, UN Doc. A/A.C.237/18 (Part II)
(Add.1). (art. 14).
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Transboundary Air Pollution, article 13 of which only provided the parties
with a possibility to settle their disputes through political means,72 the
Espoo Convention’s dispute settlement provision allows parties to declare
in writing that they accept compulsory third-party settlement as binding.
This ‘precedent’ was embraced in the protocols to the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution, as the protocols adopted from 1994
onwards all contain the option of making a declaration. It was also followed
by both of the ECE conventions adopted in Helsinki in 1992, i.e. the
Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents73 and the
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses
and International Lakes,74 and the 1998 Aarhus Convention in its article 16.
The inquiry commission procedure was quite unique when it was
adopted as a special dispute settlement procedure in the Espoo
Convention, there being only one other treaty in the field of international
environmental law that contained such a procedure previously.75 The
only other international negotiation process apart from the Espoo
Convention that tried to create a transboundary EIA procedure – the
outcome of which was the draft Transboundary Environmental Impact
Assessment Agreement negotiated under the auspices of the North
American Commission for Environmental Co-operation (NACEC) – did
not contain an inquiry commission procedure but only a general dispute
settlement clause.76
   
72 Art. 13 of the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, Geneva, 13 November
1979, Doc. E-ECE (XXXIV)-L-18: ‘If a dispute arises between two or more Contracting Parties
to the present Convention as to the interpretation or application of the Convention, they shall
seek a solution by negotiation or by any other method of dispute settlement acceptable to the
parties to the dispute.’
73 Art. 21 of the Convention on the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents, Helsinki, 17
March 1992, in force 19 April 2000, 31 ILM 1330 (1992). The Convention can be accessed via its
website at www.unece.org/env/teia/text.htm. See also the Convention’s Protocol on Civil
Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents on Transboundary Waters, Kiev, Ukraine, 21 May 2003. The Protocol has not yet
entered into force (art. 26).
74 Art. 22 of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes, Helsinki, 17 March 1992, in force 6 October 1996, Doc. ENVWA-R.53 and
Add.1. The Convention can be accessed via the Convention’s website at www.unece.org/
env/water/text/text.htm. See also the Convention’s Protocol on Water and Health, London, 17
June 1999, in force 4 August 2005, ECOSOC Doc. MP.WAT/A.C.1/1999/1, 24 March 1999 (art. 20).
75 The 1974 Nordic Environment Protection Convention, Stockholm, 19 February 1974, in force 5
October 1976, 13 ILM 352 (1974). The Protocol provides for a commission procedure in its art. 12.
76 See Timo Koivurova, Environmental Impact Assessment in the Arctic: A Study of International
Legal Norms (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2002), pp. 293–5.
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The inquiry commission procedure has inspired the use of similar proce-
dures, within the UN and the ECE in particular, in situations where it must
be decided whether a proposed major development activity is likely to cause
a significant adverse transboundary impact. The 1992 Convention on the
Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents followed the lead of the
Espoo Convention and contains an inquiry commission procedure in its
article 4(2) and Annex II that is almost identical to that found in the
Espoo Convention. Two International Law Commission (ILC)-sponsored
projects – the draft preventative rules produced by the ILC project on
International Liability77 and the 1997 Convention on the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses78 – both contain fact-finding commis-
sions that are clearly modelled after the inquiry commission in the Espoo
Convention.
Another distinct and quite recent trend in the drafting and managing of
international environmental treaties has been the creation of compliance
control systems that have separate bodies for examining suspected cases of
non-compliance and allow the plenary organ the option of taking collective
enforcement measures. It is quite interesting that a collective compliance
system was also developed in the regime of the Espoo Convention, given
that the situations it regulates are far more bilateral in nature than those in
the regulative field of other international environmental treaties, which
seek to protect a common concern of the treaty community. With this
background, the treaty community is more likely to be able to exert greater
influence in situations that are often seen as disputes between two parties
only. Through the compliance system, the treaty community can prod the
     
77 In 2001, at its fifty-third session, the International Law Commission recommended to the UN
General Assembly an elaboration of an international convention on the basis of the Draft
Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Transboundary Activities that it had
approved. The Draft Articles were clearly inspired by the Espoo Convention: they provide for a
fact-finding commission as a method of settling disputes in art. 19, one very much modelled
after the inquiry commission procedure. See art. 19 of the Draft Articles on Prevention of
Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities, Report of the International Law Commission
on the Work of Its 53rd Session, A/56/10 (Supp.), pp. 370–436. The Draft Articles are available
from the ILC website at www.un.org/law/ilc/texts/prevention/preventionfra.htm. Since the
General Assembly decided to include liability in the project again, it is not very likely that nego-
tiations will be taking place in the project in the near future. See paras. 165–74 of the Report of
the ILC (56th Session) in 2004, A/59/10 (Supp.), 16 September 2004. The report is available
from the ILC website at www.un.org/law/ilc/reports/2004/2004report.htm.
78 The Convention on the Law of Non-Navigation Uses of International Watercourses, New York,
21 May 1997, not yet in force, Doc. A/51/869. This Convention contains not only an identical
fact-finding commission but also a general dispute settlement provision: see art. 33.
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States parties to improve their capability in organizing a transboundary
EIA procedure, to participate in it as an affected State, and to educate their
civil societies to take part in it. This role of the compliance system will
become more apparent when the SEA Protocol enters into force.
The Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention is most
clearly based on the non-compliance mechanisms of the two ECE conven-
tions, the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution and
the Aarhus Convention. At first, it was extensively based on the Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution Implementation Committee
model, which itself drew heavily on the first non-compliance mechanism
developed under the Montreal Protocol.79 The work of the Compliance
Committee of the Aarhus Convention has become increasingly influential,
especially as regards the openness and transparency of the Implementation
Committee procedure. All in all, however, it is the Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution model that has figured most promi-
nently in the present structure and function of the Implementation
Committee of the Espoo Convention.
The institutional environmental protection work within the ECE –
ministerial-level meetings in the Environment for Europe process, work
among senior officials in the Committee on Environmental Protection, and
the environment secretariat of the ECE – has a clear bearing on the capacity
of each ECE environmental protection convention and provides a firm
platform for incorporating a collective dimension even in treaties that deal
primarily with bilateral issues between States.80 The ECE in general has
been very active in advocating non-compliance mechanisms, and it is no
wonder that the five treaties have drawn inspiration from each other
and prompted the Committee on Environmental Protection to draw up
   
79 See Annexes IV and V to the fourth meeting of the parties to the Montreal Protocol establishing
the Implementation Committee and its terms of reference, UNEP/OzL.Pro.4/15, p. 52. The
document is available from the ozone regime website at www.unep.org/ozone/Meeting_
Documents/mop/index.asp. For an analysis, see Tuomas Kuokkanen, ‘Putting Gentle Pressure
on Parties: Recent Trends in the Practice of the Implementation Committee under the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution’, in Jarna Petman and Jan Klabbers
(eds.), Nordic Cosmopolitanism: Essays in International Law for Martti Koskenniemi (Leiden and
Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2003), pp. 315–26, at p. 320.
80 The ECE environmental protection is organized very efficiently: it has an international organi-
zation of its own, the environment department in the ECE; senior-level officials of the ECE
Member States provide policy direction via the Committee on Environmental Policy; and
higher-level guidance is provided by the Environment for Europe process, which convenes the
environment ministers in the ECE region.
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guidelines on how to make sound non-compliance mechanisms. These
guidelines were recently adopted as the Kiev Guidelines in the last ministe-
rial meeting in the Environment for Europe process.81 Seen from the ECE
perspective, a collective dimension is always present in the transboundary
EIA procedures, which otherwise are often handled privately, as it were, by
States parties. It is this collective dimension, upheld by the Espoo
Convention being connected to the general environmental protection
structure of the ECE, which provides an important underpinning for its
dispute settlement and compliance control system.
On this basis, it seems fairly clear that the experiences gained in applying
the regime of the Espoo Convention cannot easily be transferred to the reg-
ulation of similar situations in other parts of the world, which often lack a
comparably strong institutional backing. Within the ECE, the various
international environmental treaties regularly draw inspiration from each
other, and the Espoo regime has also inspired developments in other ECE
regimes.82 Yet, as was argued above, it is also possible to use particular ele-
ments of the Espoo regime outside of the ECE context, as has been done in
the work of the International Law Commission in two instances.
     
81 The Kiev Guidelines, ECE/CEP/107, 20 March 2003. The Guidelines are available from the
Espoo Convention website at www.unece.org/env/eia/implementation.htm.
82 The Implementation Committee of the Espoo Convention has been used as a model at least in
designing a compliance mechanism for the Protocol on Water and Health to the ECE
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes.
See the second draft prepared by the Legal Bureau, MP.WAT/A.C.4/2004/8, 23 July 2004.
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